Insecure LLM output handling: CVE-2024-5565 and the model reply that ran as code
Prompt injection gets the model to say something. This is about what happens next: when a sink trusts the model's output and runs it, and when an agent with tools can reach further than anyone intended. The Vanna RCE, the LangChain exec chains, and how to bound both.
By Ahmed PingerPublished
9 min read7 views
answer = vn.ask("Show me sales by region", visualize=True)
Nothing in that call looks dangerous. It asks a question and requests a chart. Under the hood the model was asked to write the plotting code, and that code was executed. CVE-2024-5565 is what happens when an attacker controls the question: the model writes different code, and the same execution step runs it.
This post is the downstream half of the problem. Prompt injection, covered separately, is how an attacker gets the model to emit chosen text. Here the model has already emitted it. The vulnerability is on the receiving end: a component that treats model output as trusted and feeds it to something that acts on it.
The bug in one distinction
Model output is not a result. It is a string that a language model produced, and it deserves exactly the trust you would give a string a stranger typed into a form, which is none. The bug is any place that forgets this and passes the output to a sink that interprets it: a Python exec, a database driver, a shell, an HTML renderer, a file path, an outbound HTTP call.
OWASP's Gen AI project gives this its own entry, LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling, and defines it as "insufficient validation, sanitization, and handling of the outputs generated by large language models before they are passed downstream to other components and systems." Its examples are a catalogue of classic bugs reached through a new source: output run via exec or eval for remote code execution, unescaped output rendered as HTML for cross-site scripting, model-written SQL executed without parameterisation, model-built file paths enabling traversal, model text dropped into email templates for phishing.
The distinction that matters: none of these are model bugs. They are injection bugs where the tainted source happens to be a model. Everything the last twenty years taught about untrusted input still applies. The model just made the input look authoritative.
Why it varies
The severity is set by the sink, not the model.
A model that writes text into a chat bubble is low-risk, because the sink is a screen. The same model writing a string that becomes a shell command is a remote code execution primitive, because the sink is a shell. Between those sits every gradation: output that becomes a SQL WHERE clause is a SQL injection, output rendered as Markdown with an image tag is an exfiltration channel, output parsed as a file path is a traversal.
So the question to ask about any AI feature is never "is the model safe?" It is "what runs the model's output, and what can that thing do?"
The real CVE
CVE-2024-5565 is in Vanna, a library that turns natural-language questions into SQL and charts. Rated 8.1, classed CWE-94, disclosed by JFrog in May 2024. The ask method, with its default visualize=True, asks the model to generate Plotly code for the chart and then executes that generated code. Prompt injection into the question steers the model into writing arbitrary Python instead of plotting code, and the execution step runs it. The vendor's mitigation is telling in its bluntness: when calling ask with external input, set visualize=False. The dangerous behaviour was the automatic execution of model-written code, and turning it off is the fix.
LangChain has the same shape in its history. CVE-2023-29374 records that "in LangChain through 0.0.131, the LLMMathChain chain allows prompt injection attacks that can execute arbitrary code via the Python exec method," rated 9.8. The math chain asked the model to turn a word problem into a Python expression and then ran it with exec. A public issue from January 2023 demonstrated it plainly: a prompt of the form "use the calculator, then import os and read an environment variable" caused the chain to execute that code and return the value of an API key. The merged fix, PR #2943 in April 2023, replaced the chain's Python REPL with numexpr, a numeric evaluator called with an empty globals dictionary that cannot import modules or touch the filesystem. A second record, CVE-2023-36258, covers the broader pattern in LangChain before 0.0.236 where model-produced code reached os.system, exec or eval. The through-line: the fix was never a better prompt, it was removing the general-purpose execution sink.
A lab you can build
A Linux VM with Python 3 and no network egress. The lab needs no real model: a stub that returns attacker-influenced strings shows the sink failing and keeps you from calling out anywhere.
# vuln.py -- the pattern behind the CVEs, reduced to its core.
def model_reply(question: str) -> str:
# Stand-in for the LLM. In the real bug the attacker steers this via the
# question; here we let the "model" echo whatever the question implies.
if "chart" in question:
return "print('rendering chart')" # the intended, benign case
return question # attacker-influenced output
def run_feature(question: str):
code = model_reply(question) # trusted as if it were safe
exec(code) # the sink that makes it RCE
run_feature("chart please") # prints: rendering chart
run_feature("__import__('pathlib').Path('OWNED').write_text('x')")
The second call writes a file named OWNED. No model was jailbroken; the sink ran a string. That is the vulnerability in ten lines.
Now the fix, which is not a cleverer exec:
# safe.py -- remove the general sink; allow only the narrow operation.
import numexpr # pip install numexpr, inside the venv only
def run_math(question: str):
expr = model_reply(question) # still untrusted
return numexpr.evaluate(expr).item() # numeric only; cannot import or exec
numexpr.evaluate("2*(3+4)") returns 14. numexpr.evaluate("__import__('os')") raises rather than runs. The chain kept its arithmetic and lost its RCE, which is the change LangChain merged in PR #2943.
The agent half: tools widen the sink
An agent is an LLM that can call functions. Now the "sink" is not one exec; it is the union of every tool the agent can reach and everything those tools can touch. OWASP calls the failure mode LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency and names three root causes worth checking against any agent you run:
- Excessive functionality: a tool that can do more than the feature needs. A "read a file" tool implemented with a shell command can also delete files.
- Excessive permissions: a tool whose credentials are broader than the task. A database tool holding a read-write role for a read-only feature.
- Excessive autonomy: high-impact actions taken with no human in the loop. An agent that can email, pay, or deploy on its own say-so.
The chain is: attacker-controlled content reaches the model (prompt injection), the model emits a tool call the attacker wanted, and the tool executes it with the agent's privileges. The output-handling bug and the agency bug are the same bug at two scales, and the fix is the same principle at two scales: constrain what the output can reach.
If you reference a taxonomy for this, the right one is MITRE ATLAS, the adversarial-ML companion to ATT&CK, not ATT&CK itself. Confirm any technique identifier against the ATLAS site before you cite it, because these catalogues are revised and a number carried from memory is usually wrong.
Finding it in source
Look for model output flowing into a sink.
# Model output reaching a code-execution sink.
grep -rnE '\b(exec|eval)\s*\(' --include='*.py' . | grep -iE 'response|completion|reply|output|result|llm|model|answer|generated'
# Node equivalents.
grep -rnE '\b(eval|Function|child_process|exec[A-Za-z]*)\b' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' . | grep -iE 'response|completion|llm|model|output'
# Model output built into SQL, shell, or HTML without a safe API.
grep -rniE '(execute|query|cursor|os\.system|subprocess|innerHTML|dangerouslySetInnerHTML)' --include='*.py' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' . | grep -iE 'llm|model|completion|response|prompt'
Then read each agent's tool definitions and ask the three OWASP questions of every tool: does it do more than needed, hold more access than needed, act without confirmation? A tool named run_query that accepts arbitrary SQL, or a shell tool at all, is where to start.
Fixing it
Prefer a constrained sink to a guarded general one. The durable fixes above did not sanitise inputs to exec; they replaced exec with something that can only do the narrow job. numexpr for arithmetic, a query builder or parameterised statement for SQL, a fixed enum of chart types rather than generated plotting code. A sink that physically cannot run arbitrary code needs no filter.
Encode for the context at the boundary. Where output must reach HTML, SQL, or a shell, apply the same contextual encoding you would to any untrusted string: HTML-escape before rendering, bind parameters for queries, never build shell strings. OWASP's guidance is explicit: treat model output as untrusted user input and encode it for its destination.
Least privilege on tools. Give each tool the narrowest capability and the narrowest credentials that do its job. A read-only feature gets a read-only role. Scope tokens per user and per task, not per application.
Human confirmation on high-impact actions. Anything that spends, sends, deletes, or deploys should require an explicit human step, so a manipulated tool call cannot complete on its own. This is the single control that bounds excessive autonomy.
Detection
Log the output-to-sink link, not just the chat. The forensic question after an incident is "what did the model emit, and what did the system do with it?" Log the raw model output alongside the exact call it drove: the query executed, the command run, the tool invoked with its arguments. Most systems log the conversation and not the action, and the action is the part that mattered.
Alert on sink signatures in output. Model output that contains import, subprocess, os.system, <script>, UNION SELECT, or a path with ../ is either a bug in your prompt or an attack, and either way it should never reach a sink. Flag it before execution, not after.
Diff intended against actual. For a feature meant to produce arithmetic or a chart type, anything outside that grammar is anomalous by definition. The narrower you have made the sink, the sharper this signal is.
Take this away
Prompt injection is how the attacker speaks. Insecure output handling is why it matters: a sink downstream trusts what the model said and acts on it. Fix it where every injection bug is fixed, at the boundary, by removing the general-purpose sink rather than guarding it, encoding output for its destination, and giving agent tools the least capability and least privilege that does the job. The model is not the vulnerability. The exec behind it is.
Further reading
- NVD: CVE-2024-5565 and the JFrog research write-up
- NVD: CVE-2023-29374: LangChain LLMMathChain exec RCE
- NVD: CVE-2023-36258: arbitrary code execution in LangChain before 0.0.236
- LangChain issue #814: the exploit demonstration, and PR #2943: the merged numexpr fix
- OWASP LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling
- OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
- MITRE ATLAS: the adversarial-ML taxonomy (verify any technique ID before citing)
- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code
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