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cloud security
7 articles on this subject.
Deleting the file does not remove the secret: git history, and why Toyota's key sat exposed for five years
A committed secret lives in git history and in cached copies on the host, not in the file you deleted. Why a new commit changes nothing, what actually removes it, and why the only safe assumption is that the credential is already burned.
9 min read
Your state file is a plaintext credential store: Terraform secrets and CVE-2024-47083
Terraform stores secrets in state in plaintext by design, and the tooling around it leaks the same secrets into logs and CI. CVE-2024-47083 is one named instance; the sensitive flag protects your terminal, not your state.
8 min read
The bucket was never the secret: object storage exposure and presigned URL abuse
Public buckets, leaked credentials and over-scoped presigned URLs are three different object-storage failures with one outcome. MinIO CVE-2023-28432 shows why the keys, not the objects, are the prize.
9 min read
Subdomain takeover: the CNAME that outlived the thing it pointed at
A subdomain takeover happens when a DNS record still points at a cloud resource you already deleted, and an attacker recreates that resource to claim your subdomain. Here is the dangling-DNS distinction, a real CVE, a detector you can build against your own zone, and the decommissioning discipline that prevents it.
9 min read
Non-human identity: 109 machine accounts per human, and the offboarding process that never runs
Service accounts, API keys, OAuth grants and CI/CD secrets hold broader access and longer-lived credentials than any employee would be permitted to carry, and none of them appear in an access review. Inventory, short-lived tokens, and the IAM calls that give the game away.
8 min read
SSRF past the metadata endpoint: Docker on 2375, kubelet on 10250, and the 50,000 hosts TeamTNT found
IMDSv2 closed the famous SSRF target. The internal network is still full of unauthenticated control planes that will run a container for anyone who asks, and crypto-mining crews have been scanning for them since 2020.
7 min read
SSRF to cloud takeover: what Capital One taught us, and why half of EC2 still has not learned it
One HTTP request to 169.254.169.254 turned an SSRF into 100 million records. Seven years on, IMDSv2 fixes it and adoption is roughly half. How the attack works, why v2 stops it, and how to enforce it.
7 min read